What is the Three Seas Initiative?
I take a stab at explaining the Three Seas Initiative- and why this often-overlooked region matters to the United States
So long as documentation has existed in Central and Eastern Europe, the often-overlooked space between Germany and Russia, the area Romanian-British Historian David Mitrany defines as the “Middle Zone” (Aligica) has been an epicenter of imperial and geostrategic competition- a nice way to express that peace in Central and Eastern Europe has been more of an exception than the rule. Starting immediately in 1989, most of the region, except for Ukraine, Belarus, and parts of the former Yugoslavia, began the process of Euro-Atlantic Integration, first into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and then into the European Union. The immediate intention of all sides was to keep the Middle Zone’s dark past in the past. While the European Union’s heavy-handed bureaucracy is certainly worthy of criticism, one cannot dispute how useful European Union membership has been in developing the region’s infrastructure. Today, the region has larger ambitions than just EU membership. Without a secure, prosperous, and independent Middle Zone, stability in the whole of Eurasia is endangered (Aligica).
Here is where the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) comes in. In 2015, Polish President Andrzej Duda and then-Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović (who attended high school in the United States) launched the 3SI, inviting 12 members of the European Union (Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Czechia, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) to form a new regional integration format that would enhance connectivity in three core pillars: transportation, energy, and digitization (Wójcik). Greece became the 13th member in 2023, with non-EU Moldova and Ukraine as partner participants. The Three Seas in Question are the Black, located to the east of Romania, the Baltic, located to the north of Poland, and the Adriatic, whose Croatian coastline is a wildly popular destination for American tourists. In 2017, President Donald Trump was the guest of honor at the annual 3SI summit in Warsaw, where he proposed the 3SI Business Forum. The first forum occurred in Bucharest the next year (Brzezinski).
Before the China-fueled outbreak of the Covid Pandemic in March 2020, the countries of the Three Seas Initiative were unquestionably the fastest growing in Europe. This growth was largely driven by the massive imbursement of European Structural and Investment Funds to develop regional infrastructure along with private investment by German automakers. Today, the region still holds this honor, though the rate has slowed due to the disruptions of the Russia-Ukraine war and serious economic difficulties in Germany, the largest trading partner several 3SI members. Furthermore, Central and Eastern Europe offers a higher FDI return on investment than Western Europe, making the region a major economic opportunity for the United States- so long as security is assured. Since the so-called “big bang” of EU enlargement in 2004, the share of 3SI members of all 12 countries’ overall trade has increased, sometimes to more than 30% (Popławski and Jakobowski 8), giving the region greater leverage in its dealings with the European Union establishment.
One of the major consequences of the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022 has been the collapse of Russian energy influence throughout Europe- a development mostly of Moscow’s making. To punish Europe for Europe’s military support of Ukraine, Gazprom (largely an entity completely controlled by the Russian state) has throttled natural gas exports to Europe, causing an energy crisis across the continent. However, many countries of the Three Seas Initiative were prepared for this development, considering Russia’s history of illegally leveraging energy supplies for political gain. Thus, one of the major projects of 3SI has been the integration of energy markets across Central and Eastern Europe, a mini mutual defense pact from Russian energy blackmail. And since the inauguration of 3SI, we have seen multiple successes in guarding against this blackmail, such as a gas interconnector from the Baltic Sea via Poland to Slovakia, and investment enabling flows of Romanian Black Sea natural gas to Hungary (Popławski and Jakobowski 26). Both projects were realized before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The Three Seas initiative has been met with a cool response from Germany, since one of the initiators of the project, Polish President Andrzej Duda, comes from the German-skeptical Law and Justice Party in Poland. While not explicitly opposing the project, Berlin has kept its distance, indicating reservations to it (Wójcik). Likewise, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and especially Austria (who is a de facto member in name only) have shown the least enthusiasm for 3SI. Prague has however recently come to embrace 3SI, mainly out of necessity due to the sudden loss of Russian gas supplies in the region. With the potential construction of the proposed Stork II Pipeline from the main Polish port of Gdansk, the hometown of Poland’s first modern democratically elected President Lech Wałęsa, Czechia has an opportunity to import more natural gas from non-Russian sources, including the United States as well as Qatar (Brzezinski). With the Trump Administration prioritizing domestic production of fossil fuels, the only way to go with American LNG exports is up.
Despite the close ties between the Viktor Orban government and Russia and China, Hungary has not shown opposition to the Three Seas Initiative. Before giving the duties to President Duda (Brzezinski), Hungary was originally set to host next year’s 3SI summit, but ultimately backed out. This development is a sign that Hungary remains a swing state in 3SI, whose support will need to be earned. After all, without Hungary, there would be no Via Carpatia, a far-reaching and comprehensive transport corridor, the formal diplomatic language for a highway, connecting the ports of Constanta in Romania, Thessaloniki in Greece, and Klaipeda in Lithuania. The project is slated to be completed in 2025. Ambivalent Hungarian support for the 3SI is proof of Budapest’s maverick and multi-vector foreign policy, making Hungary an interesting opportunity for the United States in the coming years.
The three countries that have the most to gain from the Three Seas Initiative, and the most to lose from its failure, are the three Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Unlike Poland, the Baltic States were fully integrated Soviet Republics from their annexation in 1944 until their independence in 1991- hence the lingering connection with the Russian electricity grid rather than the standard European (Wójcik). However, as of this February, the Baltic States will be officially connected to the European grid via the Harmony Link (European Commission). Alongside the Harmony Link, the proposed Rail Baltica, which would ease the trio’s geographic barriers from the rest of the European Union and offer a critical security link with Poland during a potential military crisis with Russia, has been plagued by cost overruns and is far from completion (Chmielewski and Baniak). Rail Baltica’s struggles thus present a unique opportunity for American investment.
While not as acute as the threat of Russian military expansionism, Germany’s tacit opposition to the Three Seas Initiative presents a challenge to the emergence of an independent Central and Eastern Europe. Beyond Berlin’s distrust of Andrzej Duda (whose presidential term ends next summer), there is likely substantial concern in the European Union’s bureaucracy that a successful completion of the 3SI, outside of the framework of EU structural funds, would irreversibly alter the EU’s balance of power and give the Eastern half an equal voice at the table. This dynamic is a major incentive for the incoming Trump Administration to openly offer its systematic support to 3SI (Aligica). Such a posture would give enormous benefits to the United States, as not only would it contribute to institutionalizing security and prosperity for the Mitrany’s Middle Zone, but it would also be a shot across the bow of the European bureaucracy.
Instead of being a Middle Zone between great powers, the Three Seas Initiative showcases Central and Eastern Europe as a golden economic and security opportunity for the incoming Trump Administration, in particular regarding exports of American Natural Gas, but also to rebalance European geopolitics in a direction more favorable to the continent’s eastern half.
Works Cited:
Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan
Feedback from Paul Dragos Aligica and Ian Brzezinski